I examine the legacies of Soviet public health policy and the socialist health care system and trace how the Soviet past figures in contemporary Russian policymaking and debates about drug use, HIV, and abortion. Drug policies and mainstream views of HIV reflect continuities with key aspects of Soviet-era policies, although political leaders do not acknowledge these continuities in justifying their policies.
In abortion policy, by contrast, which is highly debated in the public realm, advocates represent themselves as differing from Soviet-era policies to justify their positions. Yet abortion activists' views of the past differ tremendously, reminding us that the Soviet past is symbolically productive for arguments about Russia's present and future.
I describe key aspects of the Soviet approach to health and compare how current drug policy (and the related management of HIV/AIDS) and abortion policies are discursively shaped in relation to the Soviet historical and cultural legacy. ( M erriam-Webster's Dictionary defines "legacy" as "something transmitted by or received from a predecessor or from the past," such as wealth, "the legacy of the ancient philosophers," and "pain and suffering" from war. Per this definition, a legacy may involve either continuities with or outcomes of a past. Continuities with Bolshevism can be found in contemporary Russian public health. But outcomes of socialism may be manifest in less direct or causal ways than the example of suffering as a legacy of war implies. Socialism's legacy also emerges in how the socialist past is selectively invoked or ignored for contemporary political agendas. 1 I compare uses of the socialist past in contemporary Russian policies on narcotics use, HIV, and abortion. The contrasting treatment of the past in these respective policies typifies a wider discursive pattern in Russian public health, in which efforts to legitimize contemporary perspectives entail selectively ignoring continuities between current Russian and previous Soviet-era policies, while strategically emphasizing discontinuities between the socialist past and the present. The Soviet past remains a structuring presence as well as a symbolically productive site for Russian public health policy 100 years since the Bolshevik Revolution.
I describe key aspects of the Soviet approach to health and some of its inadvertent effects on opiate use and abortion. I compare how current drug policy (and the related management of HIV/ AIDS) and abortion policies are discursively shaped in relation to the Soviet historical and cultural past. This comparative lens reveals how state policymakers demonstrate significant ambivalence toward the Soviet past, at times reproducing it without calling attention to continuity and at times relating to it as a source of failure to be opposed and overcome.
SOCIALIST IDEALS: THE SOCIAL HYGIENE MODEL
Upon coming to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks attacked the class character of medicine by ending private practice, establishing a universal free health care system, and addressing the social determinants of health. The first people's commissar of public health, Nikolai Semashko (1874-1949), endorsed the developing field of social hygiene-"the science of the influence of the economic and social conditions of life on the health of the population and on the means to improve that health" Similar to physicians in European socialized medical systems (and unlike US physicians working largely in private practice), the Soviet health care providers' occupational fate was determined by the state bureaucracy. But Soviet physicians were deprofessionalized and unable to lobby the state for their corporate interests; their professional mobility was predicated on their activism in the Party rather than on their expertise. Moreover, whereas in the United States and Western Europe movements for individual and women's rights in the 1960s challenged medical paternalism along with many other structures of authority, these cultural transformations did not take place in the Soviet Union. Soviet medicine's deprofessionalized structure, deontological ethics, and cultural experience of authoritarian relations upheld paternalistic clinical interactions. 8 Routinely, Soviet and postSoviet-era physicians determined treatments unilaterally, without sharing decision-making with patients 8 ; did not disclose a patient's terminal prognosis; and used placebos to deceive patients when it served treatment purposes, such as for alcoholism. 9 Although some of these practices went unquestioned, the rigidly hierarchical character of doctor-patient relations and the deficit of medical supplies generated extensive public mistrust and dissatisfaction. [8] [9] [10] The Soviet treatment of opiate use, which joined public health and policing, is an extreme instance of authoritarian relations devolving into explicit mechanisms of coercion and control.
SOVIET APPROACH TO DRUG AND OPIATE TREATMENT
Bolshevik leaders considered opiate use a pre-Revolutionary form of social deviance that would soon die out as the dramatic changes inaugurated by the Revolution took root. Having eradicated capitalism by seizing private property, collectivizing agriculture, and nationalizing industrial resources, the Bolsheviks proclaimed class itself to be eliminated. They expected the new socialist society, with cradle-to-grave welfare-which included universal state employment, guaranteed housing, education, and health care-to transform individuals into moral builders of communism (even though at times a bit of educational "enlightenment" work might be needed to hasten changes). State leaders thus faced a troubling paradox when deviance continued, and they generally sought causes in either individuals' pathological genetics or in supposed enemies of communism. In either case, they saw persistent deviance as requiring active control and repression.
Mainstream psychiatrists in the 1920s also rejected social hygiene's emphasis on the social etiology of addiction, considering opiate users to be morally depraved and mental pathologies to be related to poor genetics. 2, 4, 11 Addicts were stigmatized as unproductive, even in the many cases of patients and medical workers whose opiate use resulted from trying to control chronic pain. 4 A widely embraced solution was to rehabilitate addicts by isolating and reeducating them in labor colonies. 4 Compulsory treatment continued even after Stalin's death, a time known as "the Thaw" for the state's generally liberalizing tendencies. Although tight borders resulted in less drug trafficking than in the West, the Caucasus and Central Asia supplied opiates. By the mid-1970s, public health and policing were institutionally joined to control opiate use in the newly established narcological system, whose institutions were under the authority of both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 9 Although drug use in the Soviet Union was rarely publicly acknowledged-the ideologically correct view portrayed it as a social disease of the West-drug users who were clinically identified were treated as criminals.
Debates over the idea of involuntary treatment arose only during Perestroika, in the late 1980s-and even then just for noncriminal alcoholics. 9 It was in this era that drug use, from hashish to heroin, skyrocketed. Interestingly, although heavy alcohol use is considered culturally central to Russian national identity, the seemingly new phenomenon of drug use was severely stigmatized.
Meylakhs contextualizes this moral panic as a response to the massive economic depression and social disruptions of the 1990s, during which Russians characterized their society as having lost all moral boundaries. 12 Pornography and drugs-both now readily available-became potent symbols of the harms invading Russia from the West. Meylakhs details how media representations portrayed drug use through mythical tropes of symbolic pollution: making no distinction between occasional drug users and addicts or between "hard" and "soft" drugs, they claimed that drug addiction is incurable and depicted harm-reduction programs as wholly negative, enabling the evil to persist. Drug users were depicted as terrifying predators willing to undertake any heinous crime to ensure a fix.
Such imagery, spread through urban legends about drug users corrupting children and jeopardizing society's future, led to broad public support for coercive measures to protect society.
The Russian state's drug policy continues to be punitive, with federal support invested in antidrug law enforcement measures rather than prevention and harm reduction through opiate substitution treatment (with methadone, buprenorphine, or suboxone), the approach endorsed by human rights organizations. 13, 14 These policy approaches reproduce Soviet-era models in resorting to repression, the stigmatization of drug users, and the exploitation of the public's fear of drugs to advance anti-Western political agendas. 13, 15 And they set the stage for rapidly rising rates of HIV transmission through drug injection to be ignored.
SOCIALISM'S LEGACY FOR HIV POLICY
In the 1980s, the Soviet media presented HIV/AIDS as an outcome of the immoral behaviors of the dissolute West: homosexuality, drug use, and prostitutionphenomena that were supposedly nonexistent under socialism. 16 Questions of morality aside, it is true that Russia experienced sharply rising rates of infectious diseases, including socially transmitted infections, when socialism ended, borders opened, and a free market emerged. 17 Russia's HIV epidemic began in the 2000s and since then has been mainly transmitted through injection drug use. In 2013, for example, 80% of people registered as HIV-positive in St. Petersburg were injection drug users, and approximately half of the city's injection drug users were found to be HIV-positive. 18 The epidemic is currently passing into the general population and has reached more than 1% of the population in 9 regions of the country. 19, 20 Scholarly observers of Russia's HIV epidemic link the spread of the virus largely to the Russian state's view of drug addiction as criminal rather than medical. The use of law enforcement measures leaves drug users vulnerable to incarceration and more likely to hide, rather than seek treatment. By contrast, human rights organizations view opiate substitution treatment as a means of respecting drug users as members of society who deserve access to care, rather than social exclusion and punishment.
The implications of these dramatically different approaches became clear when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and shut down all opium substitution treatment services on the peninsula on May 1, 2014. The 800 people in Crimea who had been receiving opiate substitution treatment were placed in grave danger. Researchers found that many returned to illegal drug use, and several dozen people died in the weeks afterward. 21 Yet the head of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service portrayed the decision as a means of solving the problems arising from drug addiction, from increased crime rates to the birth of children with disabilities. He did not acknowledge that his policy continued the Soviet model of repressing drug users and treating them as criminals.
SOVIET ABORTION POLICIES
The Bolshevik Revolution established policies for gender equality that were far more progressive than those anywhere else in the world at the time. It emancipated women from the yoke of bourgeois marriage by mobilizing them into the labor force; the Soviets legalized abortion on demand in 1920 to facilitate that development. But the Bolsheviks were also pronatalist and reluctant to promote contraception on the assumption that its widespread use could lead to depopulation. 22 Indeed, the state's interest in engineering the population and increasing fertility ultimately led Stalin to recriminalize abortion in 1936. Yet his strategy failed, as women resorted to illegal abortions in massive numbers. 23 The tragedies endured during the 18 years in which women were denied legal access to abortion left a searing impression on the collective memory of the Soviet public. The majority of Russians long expressed opposition to criminalizing the procedurea perspective that has changed over the past decade. When Khrushchev legalized abortion upon coming to power in 1954, he remained firmly pronatalist. Official health promotion literature railed against the dangers of abortion, and the Ministry of Public Health made very few efforts to promote contraceptive use in its place. Few modern methods were even available in the deficit economy. The contradictory combination of liberal abortion access and low levels of contraceptive use created what has been called an "abortion culture," involving the "adaptation of the society to the widespread provision of abortion as the primary and even only method of regulating" births. 24 The state advocated childbearing and warned women who were pregnant and considering abortion that the procedure (then undertaken through dilation and curettage) was dangerous and could cause secondary sterility. Yet by the late 1980s, approximately 70% of pregnancies in Russia were terminated. 24, 25 Women resorted to abortions twice as often as they gave birth throughout the 1990s. And still, the paternalistic and pronatalist character of Soviet health care often led providers to treat women seeking abortions punitively, implying that they deserved to suffer for rejecting childbearing. 26 Despite the state's negative attitude toward abortion, the procedure remained the most accessible means of fertility control, available even through the second trimester for "social reasons." In 1987, these circumstances included severe injury or death of one's husband, divorce, the woman's or her husband's incarceration, loss of parental rights, having 3 or more children already, and pregnancy resulting from rape. 27 The new Russian Federation legally guaranteed women's right to abortion 28 and initially devoted federal resources to contraception promotion. In 1992, Yeltsin included the newly founded nongovernmental Russian Family Planning Association in the presidential program Children of Russia and allocated one million rubles for its efforts. Yet rather than supporting reproductive choices, the state aimed to improve reproductive health and increase fertility. That same year saw the beginning of a net population decline in Russia because of high male mortality and sharp decreases in fertility. The Russian popular press began announcing an impending national demographic catastrophe 26 and specifically linked it with the family planning paradigm. In the spring of 1997, a public committee called For the Moral Regeneration of the Fatherland sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church and nationalist activists submitted batches of signed petitions to the Duma demanding the government rescind funding for family planning. The Duma made the topic the subject of a roundtable discussion titled Family Planning in the Context of Russia's National Security and consequently eliminated funding of its presidential family planning program. Federal funding for contraceptives was never restored.
Despite this, cultural changes stemming from a new market in contraceptives resulted in significant decreases in abortions: between 1988 and 2014, the annual number of abortions decreased by 5 times, falling from 4.6 million to 900 000 annually in absolute numbers and from 127 to 26 per 1000 women of reproductive age. 27 All estimates anticipate continuing decreases.
THE SOVIET LEGACY IN ABORTION DEBATES
For both supporters and opponents of legal abortion in contemporary Russia, the routine use of the procedure symbolizes the irrationality and immorality of the atheistic Soviet regime. Yet these groups differ on how reproductive policy should develop. Proponents of legal access defend their position by citing the 18 years of skyrocketing maternal mortality Soviet women suffered because of the inaccessibility of safe, legal abortion between 1936 and 1954, and they caution that restricting access again would revive that risk. Yet the often difficult Soviet experience of routine abortion for fertility control long made many of these advocates uneasy about actively defending abortion as a positive or private choice; they have been much more eager to promote contraception services as a means of avoiding abortion.
Activism to restrict abortion developed gradually, along with broader trends of nationalist and Orthodox religious revival beginning in the 1990s. 29 Conservatives first delegitimized the new programs in family planning and sex education, portraying them as Western imports inappropriate for enhancing Russia's moral revival and demographic interests. 8 When conservatives introduced bills to restrict abortion, they tended to do so surreptitiously, hiding the abortion issue within legislation concerning bioethics or the protection of mothers and children 28, 30 because criminalization had minimal public support. 31 These bills failed to pass into law, but they garnered little societal pushback. Then, in 2003 and 2007, the Ministry of Public Health established the first restrictions on abortion since the Stalin era. Through bureaucratic instructions (rather than legislative processes), the ministry substantially reduced the social criteria for second-trimester abortion, policies explained in the media as efforts to improve the demographic crisis by increasing fertility.
32 These policies met with very minimal public opposition.
Since 2007, conservatives dedicated to both increasing fertility and reviving religiosity in Russia have also recast the criminalization of abortion as politically feasible. Their arguments have largely replaced Soviet-era discourses decrying abortion as a rejection of motherhood that posed the risk of secondary sterility, with new definitions of abortion as the sin of murder and a sign of the barbaric Soviet past. With these cultural frameworks increasingly accepted by the Russian public, the Ministry of Health has institutionalized new procedures for combating abortion, including compulsory antiabortion counseling for women requesting an abortion, required informed consent protocols in which women are told about a range of risks from abortion that have no scientific basis, and required ultrasound visualization of the fetus before pregnancy termination. 27 Most recently, the Orthodox Church Patriarch began urging eliminating insurance coverage for abortion, but the Duma rejected such initiatives in 2004, 2011, and 2015. Throughout these political debates, both supporters and opponents of legal abortion emphasize how their respective positions differ from the socialist past: supporters highlight the fatal consequences ensuing from abortion's criminalization during Stalinism, whereas opponents emphasize that new restrictions will help compensate for the moral and demographic calamities wrought by decades of routine abortion in the post-Stalin era. Their shared understanding of abortion as a harmful symbol of the Soviet past leads them to portray their respective positions as wholly distinct from the socialist era, ignoring continuities with the past and even with each other.
CONCLUSIONS
One hundred years after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the socialist past marks Russian public health in complex and often indirect ways. A signature achievement of the Revolution was its new system of universal access to health care, which reduced infectious disease during the early 20th century. Yet unlike Western medical systems, the Soviet system upheld a paternalistic model of patient care and held physicians to a deontological framework of medical ethics through the 1990s.
The sidelining of medical providers as a political force and their lack of corporate influence on state policy disenfranchised physicians politically and economically and confined expressions of professional power to clinical interactions with patients.
For drug users, the authoritarian character of the socialist clinic reached its extreme, as the narcological system married public health and policing for coercive treatment in labor camps and prison. In abortion policy, socialist paternalism and authoritarianism emerged as providers tried to convince women to continue pregnancies instead of terminating them and treated women who sought abortions punitively, despite the lack of contraceptive alternatives.
In the case of Russian opiate and drug policies, a Soviet-style orientation toward law enforcement and control of drug use continues, even as, discursively, policymakers do not acknowledge this continuity with the Soviet past. Advocates for HIV prevention and treatment recognize these ongoing legacies of Soviet public health and try to counter the long-standing reliance on authoritarian measures, the severe stigmatization of drug users, and the lack of resources to address the country's myriad public health needs. But their voices are severely marginalized. Russians have not expressed mass support for liberalizing drug treatment through evidencebased harm-reduction models as a way of moving beyond Soviet approaches. Rather, their outsized fear of drugs has bolstered support for the state's view of opiate substitution treatment as ipso facto wrong, without recognizing how current policy resembles Soviet-era drug policy.
In the highly debated issue of abortion we see the political uses of the past for contemporary interests. Proponents of both legal abortion access and its criminalization strive to reverse the Soviet era's routinization of abortion as fertility control. Advocates for restrictions envision reversing the post-Stalinist liberal approach to abortion access, and the Russian Ministry of Health has accepted this in virtually eliminating second-trimester terminations and establishing numerous clinic-level barriers impeding (but not preventing) women from accessing firsttrimester terminations. Still, the ministry's refusal (to date) to withdraw insurance funding for first-term abortions likely reflects its concern that severe barriers to access may result in harms to women, as occurred during abortion's criminalization between 1936 and 1954.
The end of the Soviet era has seen a dramatic shift from routine abortion to contraceptive use. However, even in contraceptive counseling, the paternalistic character of Soviet health care relations remains common. Anna Temkina has found that Russian doctors currently counsel women to use contraception as a moral responsibility to prevent unwanted pregnancy and protect their reproductive health. 33 The
Soviet legacy can thus be observed in both the direct transmission of ideas and practices (such as the continuity of hierarchical provider-patient relations) at present and indirectly (such as when Russians rhetorically invoke socialist failures to cast their current actions as different from socialism, and thus legitimate).
The socialist legacy in contemporary Russian public health is manifest in structural and ideological continuities, as in the state's punitive drug policies. It is manifest in health outcomes, as in how these criminalizing, stigmatizing policies contributed to epidemic levels of HIV. And the socialist legacy is embedded in the selective ways the past gets invoked to justify controversial proposals, as in abortion debates. The past is a dynamic presence in contemporary public health-politically embroiled, malleable, and necessary to understand.
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